Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Possible World: entity that can be quantified over. There ist a dispute over the question whether possible worlds exist or are only assumed for purposes of proofs of completeness. See also actual world, modal logic, modal realism, realism, actualism, possibility, possibilia, quantification._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David Wiggins on Possible Worlds - Dictionary of Arguments
II 290 Possible Worlds A: Telescope theory: HintikkaVsKripke (realistic view) similarity decides on cross-world identity. >Cross world identity, >Cross world identity/Hintikka, >Possible worlds/Hintikka, >Possible worlds/Kripke, >Similarity. Fixed point: identification on similarity requires that not all properties shift? >Fixed points. Feldman: E.g., You could have been like me the way I am and thus less as you are - even while I would have been more like you really are than how you’d been. B: Constructivist theory/Kripke: possible worlds are devised. ((s) That means, we cannot discover anything about possible worlds after we inventend them only for our theoretical use.)_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 |
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> Counter arguments against Wiggins
> Counter arguments in relation to Possible Worlds
